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1.1 Introduction 
	
Risk	–	the	topic	of	the	previous	chapter	–	is	the	best	known	and	perhaps	the	best	studied	example	
within	a	much	broader	class	of	cyber	security	metrics.	However,	risk	is	not	the	only	possible	cyber	
security	metric.	Other	metrics	such	as	resilience	can	exist	and	could	be	potentially	very	valuable	to	
defenders	of	ICS	systems.			
Often,	metrics	are	defined	as	measurable	properties	of	a	system	that	quantify	the	degree	to	which	
objectives	of	the	system	are	achieved.	Metrics	can	provide	cyber	defenders	of	an	ICS	with	critical	
insights	regarding	the	system.	Metrics	are	generally	acquired	by	analyzing	relevant	attributes	of	
that	system.		
In	terms	of	cyber	security	metrics,	ICSs	tend	to	have	unique	features:	in	many	cases,	these	systems	
are	older	technologies	that	were	designed	for	functionality	rather	than	security.	They	are	also	
extremely	diverse	systems	that	have	different	requirements	and	objectives.		Therefore,	metrics	for	
ICSs	must	be	tailored	to	a	diverse	group	of	systems	with	many	features	and	perform	many	different	
functions.	
In	this	chapter,	we	first	outline	the	general	theory	of	performance	metrics,	and	highlight	examples	
from	the	cyber	security	domain	and	ICS	in	particular.	We	then	focus	on	a	particular	example	of	a	
class	of	metrics	that	is	different	from	the	one	we	have	considered	in	earlier	chapters.	Instead	of	risk,	
here	we	consider	metrics	of	resilience.	Resilience	is	defined	by	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences	
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(2012)	as	“The	ability	to	prepare	and	plan	for,	absorb,	recover	from,	or	more	successfully	adapt	to	
actual	or	potential	adverse	events”.			
This	chapter	presents	two	approaches	for	the	generation	of	metrics	based	on	the	concept	of	
resilience	using	a	matrix‐based	approach	and	a	network‐based	approach.	Finally,	a	discussion	of	
the	benefits	and	drawbacks	of	different	methods	is	presented	along	with	a	process	and	tips	
intended	to	aid	in	devising	effective	metrics.	
	
1.2 Motivation 
	
Under	President	George	W.	Bush,	the	Department	of	Energy	issued	best	practices	for	
improved	industrial	control	system	(ICS)	security	(US	Department	of	Energy,	2002).	Some	
of	these	include	taking	steps	such	as	"disconnect	unnecessary	connections	to	the	SCADA	
network",	"establish	a	rigorous,	ongoing	risk	management	process"	and	"clearly	identify	
cyber	security	requirements."	Additionally,	Executive	Order	13636,	signed	by	President	
Barack	Obama	in	2013,	brought	forth	the	issue	of	cyber	security	and	resilience,	and	
proposed	the	development	of	a	risk‐based	“Cybersecurity	Framework”	(EO	13636,	2013).	
The	framework	was	presented	by	the	National	Institute	of	Standards	and	Technology	
(NIST)	and	offers	organizations	guidance	on	implementing	cybersecurity	measures.		
	
Despite	existing	guidelines	and	frameworks,	designing	and	managing	for	security	in	cyber‐
enabled	systems	remains	difficult.	This	is	in	large	part	due	to	the	challenges	associated	
with	the	measurement	of	security.	Pfleeger	and	Cunningham	(2010)	outline	nine	reasons	
why	measuring	security	is	a	difficult	task	as	it	relates	to	cybersecurity	in	general,	but	all	of	
which	also	apply	to	the	security	of	ICS	domain	(Table	1).		
Pfleeger	and	Cunningham	(2010)	note	that	one	way	to	overcome	these	challenges	is	to	
thoughtfully	develop	a	clear	set	of	security	metrics.	Unfortunately,	this	lack	of	metrics	
happens	to	be	one	of	the	greatest	barriers	to	success	in	implementing	ICS	security.	When	
ICSs	were	first	implemented,	"network	security	was	hardly	even	a	concern"	(Igure	et	al,	
2006).	Although	efforts	are	being	made	to	draft	and	enact	cyber	security	measures,	that	
gap	has	yet	to	be	closed,	even	at	a	time	of	greater	risk.	
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Table	1:	Challenges	with	Cybersecurity	Measurement	(adapted	from	Pfleeger	&	Cunningham,	2010)	
	
Challenge	 Description	
We	can’t	test	all	
security	requirements	
It	is	not	possible	to	know	all	possible	configurations	and	states	
of	the	system,	intended	uses	and	unintended	misuses	from	
users,	etc.	
Environment,	
abstraction,	and	context	
affect	security	
Systems	are	built	to	evolve	as	they	process	new	information,	
and	not	all	system	changes	are	derived	from	malicious	sources
Measurement	and	
security	interact	
Knowledge	about	a	system’s	vulnerabilities	and	safeguards	
can	affect	the	types	of	further	security	measures	implemented,	
as	well	as	modify	the	risks	that	users	are	willing	to	take		
No	system	stands	alone	 Systems	are	networked	to	interact	with	other	cyber	systems	
and	assets	
Security	is	
multidimensional,	
emergent,	and	
irreducible	
Security	exists	at	multiple	levels	of	system	abstraction,	and	
the	security	of	the	whole	system	cannot	be	determined	from	
the	security	of	the	sum	of	its	parts		
The	adversary	changes	
the	environment	
Developing	an	accurate	threat	landscape	is	difficult	due	to	
adaptive	adversaries	who	continually	develop	novel	attacks	
Measurement	is	both	an	
expectation	and	an	
organizational	objective	
Different	organizations	with	different	missions	and	
preferences	place	differing	values	on	the	benefits	of	security	
We’re	overoptimistic	 Users	tend	to	underestimate	the	likelihood	that	their	system	
could	be	the	target	of	attack	
We	perceive	gains	
differently	than	losses	
Biases	in	interpreting	expected	gains	and	losses	based	on	
problem	framing	tend	to	affect	risk	tolerance	and	decision	
making	under	uncertainty	in	predictable	but	irrational	ways	
	
	
1.3 Background on Resilience Metrics 
1.3.1 What Makes a Good Metric? 
	
According	to	the	management	adage,	“what	gets	measured	gets	done”.	As	such,	well‐
developed	metrics	can	assist	an	organization	in	reaching	its	strategic	goals	(Marr,	2010).	
Reichert	et	al.	(2007)	define	metrics	as	“measurable	properties	that	quantify	the	degree	to	
which	objectives	have	been	achieved”.	Metrics	provide	vital	information	pertaining	to	a	
given	system,	and	are	generally	acquired	by	way	of	analyzing	relevant	attributes	of	that	
system.	Some	researchers	and	practitioners	make	a	distinction	between	a	measure	and	a	
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metric	(Black	et	al.,	2008,	Linkov	et	al.,	2013a),	whereas	others	may	refer	to	them	as	
performance	measures	(Neely	et	al.,	1997),	key	performance	indicators	(Marr,	2010)	or	
strategic	measures	(Allen,	2011).	For	the	purposes	of	this	chapter,	these	are	referred	to	
generally	as	metrics.		
	
When	used	efficiently,	metrics	can	help	to	clarify	one’s	understanding	of	the	processes	of	a	
particular	area	of	a	system,	and	from	there,	provide	information	for	external	review	and	
assist	towards	further	improvement,	among	other	outputs	(Marr,	2010).	This	can	be	done	
by	establishing	benchmarks	for	a	given	metric,	where	thresholds	or	ranges	can	be	
established	(Black	et	al.,	2008).	Benchmarks,	or	standards,	help	form	the	basis	for	decision	
making	and	taking	corrective	action	(Williamson,	2006).	
	
A	critical	element	in	eliciting	a	meaningful	metric	is	to	gather	the	relevant	information	
about	one’s	system	and	to	align	that	metric	with	measurable	goals	and	strategic	objectives	
which	lie	within	the	scope	of	a	given	project	or	the	domain	of	a	particular	organizational	
structure	(Beasley	et	al.	2010,	Neely	et	al.	1997).	There	is	also	the	issue	of	scale	and	
adaptability.	Smaller	organization	may	have	metrics	dealing	with	rudimentary	security	
measures,	but	as	they	grow	larger,	these	measures	may	need	to	be	scaled	appropriately	to	
deal	with	the	security	needed	for	a	larger	organization	(Black	et	al.,	2008).		
	
There	are	key	elements	that	contribute	to	producing	a	successful	metric.	Metrics	should	be	
actionable:	they	are	not	simply	about	measuring	numerous	attributes	of	a	project;	merely	
gathering	information	without	a	goal	in	mind	will	not	provide	a	discernible	solution	(Marr,	
2010).	Such	information	in	and	of	itself	would	not	be	substantial	enough	to	be	considered	a	
metric.	Gathering	relevant	metrics	requires	delving	deeper	into	the	issues	faced	by	a	given	
system	and	asking	pertinent	questions	which	can	lead	to	actionable	improvement.	These	
include	questions	such	as	“Does	it	link	to	strategy?	Can	it	be	quantified?	Does	it	drive	the	
right	behavior?”	(Eckerson,	2009).	From	these,	one	can	obtain	metrics	which	can	in	turn	
inform	actionable	results.	Table	2	summarizes	the	desirable	characteristics	of	metrics	in	
general	terms,	and	apply	to	all	types	of	systems	including	ICSs.		
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Table	2:	Characteristics	of	Good	Metrics	(adapted	from	McKay	et	al.	2012,	Keeney	and	Gregory	2005)	
Characteristic	 Description	
Relevant	 Metrics	are	directly	linked	to	decision	making	goals	and	objectives	
Unambiguous	 Consequences	of	alternatives	can	be	clearly	measured	by	metrics	
Direct	 Metrics	clearly	address	and	describe	consequences	of	interest	
Operational	 Data	exist	and	are	available	for	the	metric	of	interest		
Understandable	 Metrics	can	be	understood	and	communicated	easily	
Comprehensive	 The	set	of	metrics	address	a	complete	suite	of	goals	and	consequences	
	
Metrics	may	be	described	as	natural,	constructed,	or	proxy.	Natural	metrics	directly	
describe	an	objective	in	units	that	are	straightforward	(e.g.,	dollars	as	a	metric	for	“costs	
associated	with	ICS	downtime”).	Constructed	metrics	may	be	used	when	natural	metrics	do	
not	exist	(e.g.,	scales	from	1	to	10	where	each	number	corresponds	to	a	defined	level	of	ICS	
performance),	and	usually	incorporate	expert	judgment.	Proxy	metrics	can	be	used	to	
indirectly	measure	an	objective	(e.g.,	the	number	of	users	with	certain	administrative	
privileges	as	a	proxy	for	access)	(McKay	et	al.	2012,	Keeney	and	Gregory	2005).		
	
There	are	different	types	of	information	that	metrics	gauge	and	the	project	team	has	the	
responsibility	of	appropriately	selecting	and	evaluating	them.		These	can	be	separated	into	
quantitative,	semi‐quantitative	and	qualitative	approaches.	Quantitative	metrics	have	
measurable,	numerical	values	attached	to	them.	Semi‐quantitative	metrics	are	not	strictly	
quantifiable	but	can	be	categorized.	Qualitative	metrics	provide	non‐numeric	information,	
for	example	in	the	form	of	aesthetics.		
	
1.3.2 Metrics for IT Systems  
	
As	described	above	in	Table	1,	cyber	systems	provide	unique	challenges.	In	particular,	the	
cyber	domain	extends	beyond	just	the	immediate	system	and	requires	a	holistic	viewpoint,	
with	many	different	technical	and	human	factors	to	be	accounted	for	(Collier	et	al.,	2014).		
Threats	to	the	system	are	also	constantly	evolving	and	growing	in	sophistication,	and	as	a	
result,	there	is	a	high	degree	of	adaptability	required	in	order	to	remain	current.	Due	to	the	
constantly	evolving	threat	space,	there	is	often	little	historical	data	for	potential	threats	
(Collier	et	al.,	2014).	
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With	cyber	metrics,	a	significant	number	of	the	main	issues	are	tailored	towards	security	
and	resilience.	The	Defense	Science	Board	(2013)	argues	that	effective	cyber	metrics	
should	be	broad	enough	to	fit	different	types	of	systems,	yet	also	be	precise	enough	to	dial	
down	into	the	specifics	of	a	given	system.	The	following	are	some	examples	of	
cybersecurity	metrics	currently	in	use.	
	
The	Common	Vulnerability	Scoring	System	(CVSS)	was	introduced	to	provide	various	
organizations	with	actionable	information	in	regards	to	assessing	IT	vulnerabilities	(Mell	et	
al.,	2007).	CVSS	groups	their	metrics	into	three	categories,	namely	Base,	Temporal,	and	
Environmental	metrics.		A	few	of	these	security	metrics	include	Collateral	Damage	
Potential,	Target	Distribution,	Report	Confidence,	Exploitability,	Access	Complexity,	Access	
Vector,	Authentication,	Integrity	Impact,	Availability	Impact,	and	Confidentiality	Impact	
(Mell	et	al.,	2007).		There	are	general	scoring	tips	for	the	way	that	vulnerabilities	are	
assessed;	vulnerabilities	are	not	scored	based	on	interactions	with	other	vulnerabilities,	
rather,	they	are	scored	independently.	The	main	measure	of	vulnerability	is	its	impact	on	
the	key	service.	Vulnerabilities	are	scored	according	to	commonly	used	privileges,	which	
might	be	a	default	setting	in	certain	situations.	If	a	vulnerability	can	be	exploited	by	
multiple	exploits,	it	is	scored	with	the	exploit	that	will	present	the	maximum	impact	(Mell,	
et	al.,	2007).	CVSS	allows	vulnerability	scores	to	be	standardized,	and	Base	metrics	are	
normalized	on	a	scale	of	0	–	10.	They	can	be	optionally	refined	by	including	values	from	
Temporal	and	Environmental	metrics.		
	
The	Center	for	Internet	Security	(CIS)	has	also	established	metrics	for	organizations	to	use	
(CIS,	2010).	CIS	has	divided	their	metrics	into	six	critical	business	functions.	These	are	
Incident	Management,	Vulnerability	Management,	Patch	Management,	Configuration	
Management,	Change	Management	and	Application	Security.	It	also	recognizes	hierarchies	
and	interdependencies	of	metrics,	for	instance	citing	management	metrics	as	being	of	
primary	importance	to	an	organization,	while	noting	that	some	of	those	metrics	may	
depend	on	the	prior	implementation	of	technical	metrics	(CIS,	2010).	Some	of	the	metrics	
include	Cost	of	Incidents	and	Patch	Policy	Compliance.	Cost	of	Incidents	refers	to	a	number	
of	potential	losses,	such	as	customer	lists	or	trade	secrets	under	a	“direct	loss”	and	a	“cost	
of	restitution”,	for	example	in	the	event	that	fines	are	levied	due	to	an	incident.		This	is	
measured	by	the	summation	of	the	numerical	values	of	all	the	costs	associated	with	the	
metric.	Examples	relating	to	security	include	Mean	Time	to	Incident	Discovery,	Mean	Time	
Between	Security	Incidents	and	Mean	Time	to	Incident	Recovery	(CIS,	2010).	For	an	
example	of	measurement,	Mean	Time	to	Incident	Discovery	measures	the	summation	of	the	
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time	between	incidents	and	discoveries	of	incidents,	divided	by	total	number	of	incidents	
recovered	during	those	time	frames	(CIS,	2010).		
	
The	Cybersecurity	Framework	developed	by	NIST	stemming	from	EO	13636	was	released	
in	February	2014	(NIST	2014a).	The	final	Cybersecurity	Framework	consists	of	a	
Framework	Core,	which	presents	a	set	of	five	“concurrent	and	continuous	Functions	–	
Identify,	Protect,	Detect,	Respond,	Recover”	(NIST	2014).	These	functions	are	the	“high‐
level,	strategic	view	of	the	lifecycle	of	an	organization’s	management	of	cybersecurity	risk,”	
which	feature	subsequent	categories	and	subcategories	for	the	functions,	relating	to	
outcomes	and	activities	(NIST	2014).	For	example,	the	Respond	function	consists	of	five	
categories,	among	which	includes	Mitigation.	Mitigation	is	then	further	subdivided	into	
metrics	related	to	containing	and	eradicating	incidents.	The	Framework	Core	is	used	as	a	
scorecard	of	progress	–	the	current	guidance	calls	for	first	developing	an	organization’s	
Current	Profile,	which	consists	of	assigned	scores	based	on	the	organization’s	performance	
in	each	of	the	categories	and	subcategories.	This	Current	Profile	is	then	compared	to	a	
Target	Profile,	representing	the	desired	state	of	the	organization	in	each	of	the	same	
categories	and	subcategories.	The	shortfalls	between	these	profiles	can	be	viewed	as	gaps	
in	an	organization’s	cyber‐risk	management	capabilities	which	can	inform	prioritization	of	
corrective	measures	(NIST	2014;	Collier	et	al.	2014).	
	
The	Software	Engineering	Institute	(SEI)	at	Carnegie	Mellon	University	developed	a	
framework	for	assessing	operational	resilience	which	features	a	set	of	Top	Ten	Strategic	
Measures,	which	aim	to	be	mapped	down	to	the	level	of	specific	Process	Area	measures	
(Allen	and	Curtis,	2011).		Under	the	heading	of	High‐Value	Services	and	Assets,	one	of	the	
measures	is	related	to	the	percentage	of	high‐value	services	that	do	not	satisfy	their	
assigned	resilience	requirements	(Allen	and	Curtis,	2011).	The	SEI	framework	also	
contains	a	large	amount	of	resilience	measures,	spanning	26	different	Process	Areas.	For	
example,	under	the	Process	Area	of	Environmental	Control,	there	are	measures	such	as	
Percentage	of	Facility	Assets	that	have	been	Inventoried,	Elapsed	Time	Since	the	Facility	
Asset	Inventory	was	Reviewed,	and	Elapsed	Time	Since	Risk	Assessment	of	Facility	Assets	
Performed	(Allen	and	Curtis,	2011),	where	the	term	“assets”	applies	to	high‐value	services.	
These	are	presented	in	a	table	with	traceability,	assigning	an	identification	number	to	each	
metric	along	with	their	applicability	to	goals	within	the	Process	Areas.		
8	
	
	
MITRE	proposed	a	framework	entitled	Cyber	Resiliency	Engineering	Framework,	which,	
among	its	goals	aims	to	“motivate	and	characterize	cyber	resiliency	metrics”	(Bodeau	
2011).	The	framework	contains	four	Cyber	Resiliency	Goals:	Anticipate,	Withstand,	
Recover,	and	Evolve.	There	are	a	total	of	eight	objectives	which	are	a	subset	of	the	goals.	
For	example	Anticipate	has	three	objectives:	Predict,	Prevent,	and	Prepare	(Bodeau,	2011).	
This	hierarchy	can	be	used	to	inform	and	categorize	the	appropriate	resilience	metrics.	
These	are	meant	to	be	performed	simultaneously,	and	bear	a	resemblance	to	the	NIST	
framework	mentioned	earlier.		
	
1.3.3 Metrics for ICS Networks 
	
The	above	metrics	were	developed	for	“cyber”	systems	generally	speaking,	not	specifically	
for	ICSs,	although	they	can	be	tailored	with	ICSs	in	mind.	ICSs	in	particular	are	a	unique	
case;	in	many	situations,	these	systems	have	older	models,	and	were	designed	for	
functionality	rather	than	security	(US	Department	of	Energy,	2002).	They	constitute	a	
diverse	group	of	systems	that	have	different	requirements	for	their	various	operations	
(Pollet,	2002).		
	
Specifically	as	it	relates	to	ICSs,	time,	safety	and	continuation	of	services	are	of	great	
importance,	since	many	systems	are	in	a	position	where	a	failure	can	result	in	a	threat	to	
human	lives,	environmental	safety,	or	production	output	(Stouffer,	2011).	Since	these	risks	
are	different	than	those	faced	by	information	technology	(IT)	systems,	different	priorities	
are	also	necessary.	Examples	of	some	unique	considerations	in	comparison	to	cyber	
security	include	the	longer	lifespan	of	system	components,	physically	difficult	to	reach	
components,	and	continuous	availability	requirements	(Stouffer,	2011).	Additionally,	these	
systems	typically	operate	in	separate	fields	than	cybersecurity,	such	as	in	the	gas	and	
electric	industries,	and	so	metrics	must	be	adapted	to	fit	these	different	organizational	
structures	(McIntyre	et	al.,	2007).	Critical	infrastructures	are	common	for	ICSs,	and	as	a	
result	“downtime	and	halting	of	production	are	considered	unacceptable”	(McIntyre	et	al.,	
2007).		
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Stouffer	et	al.	(2011)	compare	the	differences	between	information	technology	(IT)	system	
and	ICSs,	focusing	on	the	safety‐critical	nature	of	many	ICS	networks.	For	example,	“high	
delay	and	jitter	may	be	acceptable”	as	a	performance	requirement	for	IT	systems,	whereas	
for	ICSs,	it	may	not	be	acceptable	(Stouffer,	2011).	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	there	is	a	
time‐critical	nature	to	ICSs,	whereas	for	IT	systems	there	is	high	throughput,	allowing	for	
some	jitter	(Stouffer,	2011).		Similarly,	for	IT,	“systems	are	designed	for	use	with	typical	
operating	systems”	and	for	ICSs,	there	are	“differing	and	possibly	proprietary	operating	
systems,	often	without	security	capabilities	built	in”.	There	are	also	availability	
requirements,	in	that	sometimes	an	IT	strategy	may	require	restarting	or	rebooting	a	
process,	something	which,	for	ICS	processes,	requires	more	careful	planning	as	unexpected	
outages	and	quickly	stopping	and	starting	a	system	are	not	acceptable	solutions	(Stouffer,	
2011).	With	these	key	differences	between	the	two	domains,	there	are	varying	levels	of	
adaptation	needed	in	order	to	begin	the	process	of	securing	ICS	networks.		
	
The	US	National	Security	Agency	(NSA)	drafted	a	framework	for	ICS	networks,	focusing	on	
potential	impact	and	loss	relating	to	a	network	compromise	(NSA,	2010).	They	suggested	
assigning	loss	metrics	incorporating	NIST’s	framework:		compromises	pertaining	to	
Confidentiality,	Integrity	and	Availability	for	each	network	asset	(NSA,	2010).	A	
Confidentiality	compromise	is	defined	as	an	“unauthorized	release	or	theft	of	sensitive	
information”	e.g.	theft	of	passwords	(NSA,	2010).	An	Integrity	compromise	is	defined	as	an	
“unauthorized	alteration	or	manipulation	of	data”,	e.g.	manipulation	of	billing	data	(NSA,	
2010).	An	Availability	compromise	is	defined	as	a	“loss	of	access	to	the	primary	mission	of	a	
networked	asset”	e.g.	deletion	of	important	data	from	a	database	(NSA,	2010).	These	may	
also	be	streamlined	into	one	metric,	using	the	highest	value	(e.g.	of	Low,	Moderate	or	High)	
among	the	three	areas.		
	
The	assignment	of	a	threat	metrics	at	each	potential	attack	vector	was	suggested,	but	
specific	examples	were	not	provided.	Five	threat	sources	were	identified:	Insiders,	
Terrorists	or	Activists,	Hackers	or	Cyber‐Criminals,	Nation/State	Sponsored	Cyber‐Warfare	
and	Competitors	(NSA,	2010).	Both	loss	and	threat	metrics	can	be	rated	on	a	constructed	
scale	(Low,	Moderate	or	High)	and	given	a	numeric	rating	on	a	set	scale.	It	was	mentioned	
that	the	important	consideration	is	to	have	a	scale,	and	that	the	number	of	graduations	in	
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the	scale	is	not	important,	so	long	as	the	constructed	scale	remain	consistent	(e.g.	a	
potential	for	loss	of	life	will	rank	as	High)	(NSA,	2010).	Combining	results	of	metrics	was	
also	discussed	as	a	possibility.	As	an	example,	for	a	given	point	in	the	network,	a	Loss	
Metric	is	assigned	a	score	of	High	on	the	constructed	scale	(3)	and	a	Threat	metric	at	that	
same	network	point	is	rated	at	Moderate	(2).	From	this,	one	can	arrive	at	a	composite	
priority	value,	which	is	simply	the	sum	of	those	two	scores.	Other	such	points	can	be	
evaluated	and	then	prioritized	and	ranked	(NSA,	2010).	The	scoring	methodology	is	a	basic	
example,	(and	not	the	only	method	‐	weighing	metrics	was	listed	as	a	possibility	(NSA,	
2010))	and	more	robust	methods	can	be	devised.	
Boyer	and	McQueen	(2008)	devised	a	set	of	ideal‐based	technical	metrics	for	control	
systems.	They	examined	seven	security	dimensions	and	present	an	ideal,	or	best	case	
scenario,	for	each	of	them.	The	ideals	are	Security	Group	Knowledge,	Attack	Group	
Knowledge,	Access,	Vulnerabilities,	Damage	Potential,	Detection,	and	Recovery.	For	the	
Access	dimension,	the	ideal	states	that	the	system	is	inaccessible	to	attack	groups.	The	
security	dimension	of	Vulnerabilities	has	an	ideal	stating	that	the	system	has	no	
vulnerabilities	(Boyer	and	McQueen,	2008).	By	the	very	nature	of	an	ideal,	these	may	be	
impossible	to	achieve	and	maintain	in	the	real	world.	But	from	them,	metrics	were	devised	
that	could	best	represent	the	realization	of	these	ideals.	Under	the	vulnerability	dimension,	
the	metric	Vulnerability	Exposure	is	defined	as	“the	sum	of	known	and	unpatched	
vulnerabilities,	each	multiplied	by	their	exposure	time	interval.”	It	was	suggested	that	this	
metric	could	be	broken	down	into	separate	metrics	for	different	vulnerability	categories,	as	
well	as	including	a	prioritization	of	vulnerabilities,	citing	CVSS.	Under	the	Access	
dimension,	there	is	the	metric	Root	Privilege	Count,	which	is	the	count	of	all	personnel	with	
key	privileges,	arguing	in	favor	of	the	principle	of	least	privilege,	which	states	that	“every	
program	and	every	privileged	user	of	the	system	should	operate	using	the	least	amount	of	
privilege	necessary	to	complete	the	job”	(Saltzer,	1974).	This	logical	ordering	of	metrics	
within	the	scope	of	ideals	can	be	of	value	to	those	wishing	to	devise	their	own	set	of	
metrics.			
	
The	ideal‐based	metrics	(Boyer	and	McQueen,	2008)	also	acknowledge	the	physical	space	
of	ICS	networks.	The	metric	Rogue	Change	Days,	which	is	the	number	of	changes	to	the	
system	multiplied	by	the	number	of	days	undetected,	includes	Programmable	Logic	
Controllers	and	Human‐Machine	Interfaces	and	other	ICS	related	systems.	Component	Test	
Count,	a	metric	measuring	the	number	of	control	system	components	which	have	not	been	
tested	is	a	simple	measure,	but	of	significance	due	to	numerous	components	in	use	in	an	
ICS	system.			
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Within	the	ideals,	the	metric	of	Attack	Surface	(defined	by	Manadhata	and	Wing	(2011)	as	
“the	subset	of	the	system’s	resources	(methods,	channels,	and	data)	potentially	used	in	
attacks	on	the	system”)	was	determined	to	not	be	developed	enough	for	real	world	use.	
Boyer	and	McQueen	further	argue	that	“a	credible	quantitative	measure	of	security	risk	is	
not	currently	feasible”	(Boyer	and	McQueen	2008).	But	with	the	inclusion	of	a	theoretical	
metric,	and	a	framework	for	security,	this	demonstrates	a	forward	thinking	attitude	that	
can	be	built	upon	by	those	aiming	to	establish	their	own	security	protocols.	This	represents	
important	future	work	for	the	ICS	and	security	communities.	Comparisons	between	the	
NSA	approach	and	the	approach	outlined	by	Boyer	and	McQueen	are	presented	in	Table	3.	
	
Table	3:	Comparison	between	ICS	Metrics	
	 National	Security	Agency	(2010)	 Boyer	and	McQueen	(2008)	
Focus	 Loss	and	Threat	focused	Metrics	(p.	
10,	15)	
Quantitative	technical	metrics	(p.1),	ideal	
based:	attempted	to	have	metrics	that	could	
strive	toward	ideal	scenarios	within	seven	
security	areas	
Amount	 Three	loss	metrics	(per	networked	
asset),	one	Threat	metric	(per	
potential	attack	vector)	
13	total	metrics	(suggested	total:	less	than	
20)	
Applied	or	
Theoretical	
Suggests	deployable	metrics	 Discusses	both	deployable	and	theoretical	
metrics	(p.	10,	11)	
Quantitative	or	
Qualitative	
Semi‐qualitative	(suggests	High,	
Medium,	Low,	with	allowance	for	
numeric	attachment	to	these	
values)	
Does	not	focus	on	qualitative	metrics	(p.	1),	
but	on	quantitative	metrics		
Combination	of	
Metrics	
Presents	method	to	combine	results	
of	metric	scores	for	ranking		
No	combination	of	metrics		
Consequence	
Considerations	
Loss	Metrics	are	related	to	
Confidentiality,	Integrity,	
Availability	
Acknowledges	the	purpose	of	security	is	
protection	of	Confidentiality,	Integrity	and	
Availability	(p.	4)		
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Complementary	research	to	metrics	development	in	the	ICS	realm	is	currently	being	
conducted.	One	such	effort	is	to	develop	a	standardized	taxonomy	of	cyber	attacks	on	
SCADA	systems	(Zhu	et	al.,	2011).	A	common	language	for	describing	attacks	across	
systems	can	facilitate	the	development	of	further	threat	and	vulnerability	metrics	for	ICSs.	
In	addition,	the	development	of	a	national	testbed	for	SCADA	systems	is	being	developed	by	
the	Department	of	Energy	which	will	enable	the	modeling	and	simulation	of	various	threat	
and	vulnerability	scenarios,	which	will	allow	researchers	to	develop	a	better	understanding	
of	what	metrics	may	or	may	not	be	useful	in	monitoring	and	management	of	these	systems	
(US	Department	of	Energy,	2009).	Another	development	related	to	metrics	research	is	the	
investigation	of	tradeoffs	between	certain	critical	metrics.	One	example	is	between	
optimizing	system	performance	with	system	security,	where	additional	security	measures	
may	result	in	reduced	performance.	Zeng	&	Chow	(2012),	developed	an	algorithmic	
technique	to	determine	the	optimal	tradeoff	between	these	two	metrics,	and	the	method	
can	be	extended	to	tradeoffs	between	other	metrics	as	well.		
1.4 Approaches for ICS Metrics 
	
While	various	frameworks	and	sets	of	metrics	exist,	such	as	the	ones	mentioned	in	the	
previous	section,	it	can	be	difficult	for	managers	and	system	operators	to	decide	whether	to	
adopt	or	modify	an	existing	set,	or	to	create	an	entirely	new	set	of	metrics.	Balancing	the	
tradeoffs	between	generalizable	metrics	and	specific	system‐level	and	component‐level	
metrics	can	be	challenging	(Defense	Science	Board,	2013).	The	following	approaches	
provide	a	structured	way	to	think	about	developing	metrics,	allowing	users	to	leverage	
existing	metrics	but	also	identify	gaps	where	new	metrics	may	need	to	be	created.	The	use	
of	such	structured	and	formalized	processes	requires	the	thoughtful	analysis	of	the	systems	
being	measured,	but	also	how	they	relate	to	the	broader	organizational	context,	such	as	
goals,	constraints,	and	decisions	(Marr,	2010).	Moreover,	the	development	of	a	
standardized	list	of	questions	or	topics	helps	to	simplify	the	process	of	designing	a	metric.	
The	development	of	metrics	should	be	a	smooth	process,	and	such	a	list	can	provide	insight	
into	the	“behavioral	implications”	of	the	given	metrics	(Neely	et	al.	1997).	
	
1.4.1 Cyber Resilience Matrix Example 
	
The	first	method	is	based	on	the	work	of	Linkov	et	al.	(2013a).	Unlike	traditional	risk‐based	
approaches,	this	approach	takes	a	resilience‐centric	theme.	Much	has	been	written	
elsewhere	on	the	relative	merits	of	a	resilience‐focused	approach	(see	Linkov	et	al.,	2013b,	
2014;	Collier	et	al.	2014;	Roege	et	al.	2014;	DiMase	et	al.	2015),	but	we	shall	briefly	
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summarize	the	argument	here.	Traditional	risk	assessment	based	on	the	triplet	formulation	
proposed	by	Kaplan	and	Garrick	(1981)	becomes	difficult	to	implement	in	the	
cybersecurity	context	due	to	the	inability	to	frame	and	evaluate	multiple	dynamic	threat	
scenarios,	quantify	vulnerability	against	adaptive	adversaries,	and	estimate	the	long‐term	
and	widely	distributed	consequences	of	a	successful	attack.	Instead	of	merely	hardening	
the	system	against	potential	known	threats	in	a	risk‐based	approach,	the	system	can	be	
managed	from	the	perspective	of	resilience,	which	includes	the	ability	of	one	or	more	
critical	system	functionalities	to	quickly	“bounce	back”	to	acceptable	levels	of	performance.	
As	a	result,	a	resilient	system	can	withstand	and	recover	from	a	wide	array	of	known	and	
unknown	threats	through	processes	of	feedback,	adaptation,	and	learning.	
	
Following	this	thought	process,	Linkov	et	al.	(2013a)	established	a	matrix‐based	method.	
On	one	axis,	the	steps	of	the	event	management	cycle	identified	as	necessary	for	resilience	
by	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences	(2012)	are	listed,	and	include	Plan/Prepare,	Absorb,	
Recover,	and	Adapt.	Note	that	the	ability	to	plan/prepare	is	relevant	before	an	adverse	
event,	and	the	other	capabilities	are	relevant	after	disruption.	On	the	other	axis	are	listed	
the	four	domains	in	which	complex	systems	exist	as	identified	by	Alberts	(2002),	and	
include	Physical,	Information,	Cognitive,	and	Social	domains.	The	Physical	domain	refers	to	
the	physical	resources	and	capabilities	of	the	system.	The	Information	domain	refers	to	the	
information	and	data	that	characterize	the	Physical	domain.	The	Cognitive	domain	
describes	the	use	of	the	other	domains	for	decision	making.	Finally,	the	Social	domain	
refers	to	the	organizational	structure	and	communication	systems	for	transmitting	
information	and	making	decisions	(Alberts	2002).		
	
Together,	these	axes	form	a	set	of	cells	that	identify	areas	where	actions	can	be	taken	in	
specific	domains	to	enhance	the	system’s	overall	ability	to	plan	for,	and	absorb,	recover,	
and	adapt	to,	various	threats	or	disruptions	(Figure	1).	Each	cell	is	designed	to	answer	the	
question:	“How	is	the	system’s	ability	to	[plan/prepare	for,	absorb,	recover	from,	adapt	to]	
a	cyber	disruption	implemented	in	the	[physical,	information,	cognitive,	social]	domain?”	
(Linkov	et	al.	2013a).	
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	Figure	1:	Generic	Resilience	Matrix	
A	resulting	set	of	49	metrics	are	produced	that	span	the	various	cells	of	the	matrix,	and	
selected	metrics	are	shown	in	Table	4	(see	Linkov	et	al.	2013a	for	the	complete	list).	
Metrics	are	drawn	from	several	sources	and	are	meant	to	be	general	and	not	necessarily	
comprehensive.		For	example,	under	Adapt	and	Information,	a	metric	states	“document	
time	between	problem	and	discovery,	discovery	and	recovery,”	which	has	a	parallel	to	the	
Mean	Time	to	Incident	Discovery	within	SEI’s	guidance.	The	metrics	under	Plan	and	
Information,	related	to	identifying	internal	and	external	system	dependencies	can	be	
compared	to	the	Temporal	Metric	of	Access	Complexity	from	CVSS,	which	relates	to	how	
easily	a	vulnerability	can	be	exploited.	The	metric	under	Prepare	and	Social	presents	a	
simple	yet	important	message	that	holds	true	in	all	of	the	frameworks:	“establish	a	cyber‐
aware	culture.”		
The	resilience	matrix	approach	described	in	Linkov	et	al.	(2013a)	has	several	strengths	in	
that	the	method	is	relatively	simple	to	use	and	once	metrics	have	been	generated,	it	can	
serve	as	a	platform	for	a	multi‐criteria	decision	aid	(Collier	&	Linkov,	2014).	It	has	the	
potential	to	serve	as	a	scorecard	in	order	to	capture	qualitative	information	about	a	
system’s	resilience,	and	aid	managers	and	technical	experts	in	identifying	gaps	in	the	
system’s	security.	However,	the	resilience	matrix	does	not	capture	the	explicit	temporal	
nature	of	resilience	(i.e.,	mapping	the	critical	functionality	over	time)	or	explicitly	model	
the	system	itself.	In	this	regard,	it	can	be	viewed	as	a	high	level	management	tool	that	can	
be	used	to	identify	a	snapshot	where	more	detailed	analyses	and	modeling	could	
potentially	be	carried	out.	
	
Plan & 
Prepare
Absorb Recover Adapt
Physical
Information
Cognitive
Social
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Table	4:	Selected	Cybersecurity	Metrics	Derived	from	the	Resilience	Matrix	(adapted	from	Linkov	et	
al.,	2013a).	
	 Plan/Prepare	 Absorb	 Recover	 Adapt	
Physical	 Implement	
controls/senso
rs	for	critical	
assets	and	
services	
Use	redundant	
assets	to	
continue	
service	
Investigate	and	
repair	
malfunctioning	
controls	or	
sensors	
Review	asset	and	
service	
configuration	in	
response	to	
recent	event	
Information	 Prepare	plans	
for	storage	and	
containment	of	
classified	or	
sensitive	
information	
Effectively	and	
efficiently	
transmit	
relevant	data	
to	responsible	
stakeholders/d
ecision	makers	
Review	and	
compare	
systems	
before	and	after	
the	event	
Document	time	
between	problem
and	discovery,	
discovery	and	
recovery	
Cognitive	 Understand	
performance	
trade‐offs	of	
organizational	
goals	
Focus	effort	on	
identified	
critical	assets	
and	services	
Establish	
decision	making	
protocols	or	aids	
to	select	
recovery	
options	
Review	
management	
response	and	
decision	making	
processes	
Social	 Establish	a	
cyber‐aware	
culture	
Locate	and	
contact	
identified	
experts	and	
responsible	
personnel	
Determine	
liability	for	the	
organization	
Evaluate	
employees	
response	to	
event	in	order	to	
determine	
preparedness	
and	
communications	
effectiveness	
	
	
	
1.4.2 Network Simulation Example 
	
The	second	method	is	based	on	modeling	of	complex	cyber	and	other	systems	as	
interconnected	networks,	where	a	failure	in	one	sector	can	cascade	to	other	dependent	
networks	and	assets	(Vespignani,	2010).	This	is	a	reasonable	assumption	for	ICS	networks;	
for	example,	a	disruption	of	the	electrical	grid	can	directly	impact	dependent	sectors	such	
as	the	network	controlling	ICS	devices	leading	to	a	cascade	of	failures	as	it	is	believed	to	
have	happened	during	the	Italian	blackout	in	2003	(Buldyrev	et	al.,	2010).	Thus	the	
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assessment	of	the	security	of	a	single	ICS	network	should	be	viewed	in	the	context	of	a	
larger	network	of	interdependent	systems.	
	
Ganin	et	al.	(2015)	took	this	network‐oriented	view	in	developing	a	methodology	to	
quantitatively	assess	the	resilience	(and	thus	security)	of	networked	cyber	systems.	They	
built	upon	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences	(2012)	definition	of	resilience	as	a	system	
property	that	is	inherently	tied	to	its	ability	to	plan	for,	absorb,	recover	from,	and	adapt	to	
adverse	events.	In	order	to	capture	the	state	of	the	system	the	authors	propose	to	use	the	
concept	of	critical	functionality	defined	as	a	time‐specific	performance	function	of	the	
system	considered	and	derived	based	on	the	stakeholder’s	input.	For	instance	in	the	
network	of	power	plants,	the	critical	functionality	might	represent	the	total	operational	
capacity.	In	the	network	of	computers	it	might	represent	the	fraction	of	servers	and	
services	available.	Values	of	critical	functionality	are	real	numbers	from	0	to	1.	Other	key	
elements	to	quantify	resilience	are	the	networked	system’s	topology	and	dynamics;	the	
range	of	possible	adverse	events	(for	example,	a	certain	damage	to	nodes	of	the	network);	
and	the	control	time	TC	(that	is	the	time	range	over	which	the	performance	of	the	system	is	
evaluated).	Then	the	dependency	of	the	critical	functionality	(averaged	over	all	adverse	
events)	over	time	is	built.	Ganin	et	al.	(2015)	refer	to	this	dependency	as	the	resilience	
profile.	As	it	is	typically	computationally	prohibitive	or	not	possible	at	all	(in	case	of	
continuous	variables	defining	nodes’	states)	to	consider	all	the	ways	an	adverse	event	can	
happen,	it	is	suggested	to	utilize	a	simulation	based	approach	with	Monte‐Carlo	sampling.	
	
Given	its	profile	in	normalized	time	(where	time	TC	is	taken	to	be	1),	the	resilience	of	the	
network	can	be	measured	as	the	area	under	the	curve	(yellow	region	in	Figure	2).	This	
allows	mapping	of	the	resilience	to	real	values	ranging	between	0	and	1.	
Another	important	property	of	the	system	is	obtained	by	finding	the	minimum	of	the	
average	critical	functionality.	Some	researchers	refer	to	this	value	as	robustness	M	
(Cimellaro	et	al.,	2010),	while	Linkov	et	al.	(2014)	note	that	1	–	M	corresponds	to	the	
measure	of	risk.	
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	Figure	2:	A	generalized	resilience	profile,	where	a	system’s	resilience	is	equal	to	the	area	below	the	
critical	functionality	curve	(adapted	from	Ganin	et	al.,	2015).	
	
	
In	their	paper	Ganin	et	al.	(2015)	illustrated	the	approach	on	a	directed	acyclic	graph.	Each	
level	in	this	graph	represents	a	set	of	nodes	from	certain	infrastructure	system	(e.g.	
electrical	grid,	computers	etc.).	Nodes	of	different	levels	are	connected	by	directed	links	
representing	a	dependency	of	the	destination	node	on	the	source	node.	In	the	simplest	case	
a	node	in	a	certain	level	requires	supply	(or	a	dependency	link)	from	a	node	in	each	of	the	
upper	levels	and	does	not	depend	on	any	nodes	in	the	lower	levels.	Other	parameters	of	the	
model	include	node	recovery	time	(TR)	–	a	measure	of	how	quickly	a	node	can	return	to	an	
active	state	after	it’s	been	inactivated	as	a	result	of	an	adverse	event;	redundancy	(pm)	–	the	
probability	controlling	the	number	of	additional	potential	supply	links	from	upper	levels	to	
lower	levels;	and	switching	probability	(ps),	controlling	ease	of	replacement	of	a	disrupted	
supply	link	with	a	potential	supply	link.	These	parameters	could	be	extended	to	other	
situations	to	inform	how	a	system	may	display	resilient	behavior,	and	thus	increasing	the	
security	of	the	system	as	a	whole.	
	
The	authors	found	that	there	is	strong	synergy	between	pm	and	ps;	increasing	both	factors	
together	produces	a	rapid	increase	in	resilience,	but	increasing	only	one	or	the	other	
variable	will	cause	the	resilience	metric	to	plateau.	Resilience	is	strongly	affected	by	the	
temporal	switching	time	factor,	TR.	This	temporal	factor	determines	the	characteristics	of	
the	recovery	phase	and	has	a	greater	impact	on	the	calculated	resilience	than	does	the	
potential	increase	in	redundancy.	This	is	particularly	true	when	the	switching	probability	
ps	is	low.	An	important	long	term	challenge	is	to	model	adaptation,	which,	according	to	the	
National	Academy	of	Sciences,	is	part	of	the	response	cycle	that	follows	restoration	and	
includes	all	activities	that	enable	the	system	to	better	resist	similar	adverse	events	in	the	
future.	
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Ganin	et	al.	(2015)	note	that	the	main	advantages	of	the	approach	include	its	applicability	
to	any	system	that	can	be	represented	as	a	set	of	networks.	Also	both	the	resilience	and	the	
robustness	of	a	system	are	metricized	using	a	real	value	in	range	between	0	and	1	(where	1	
corresponds	to	the	perfect	resilience	or	robustness)	making	comparison	of	resilience	of	
different	systems	easy.	On	the	other	hand	mapping	the	resilience	property	of	a	system	to	a	
single	value	necessarily	shadows	some	system’s	important	characteristics	(for	instance,	the	
rate	of	recovery).		The	resilience	profile	could	be	used	as	a	more	holistic	representation	of	
the	system’s	resilience	noting	that	even	in	that	case	only	the	average	value	of	critical	
functionality	(at	each	time	step)	is	taken	into	account.	To	fully	describe	a	system	one	
should	consider	the	distribution	of	the	value	of	critical	functionality	(at	each	time	step)	for	
different	initial	adverse	events.	Finally,	it	is	not	possible	to	simulate	all	adverse	events	from	
the	range	used	to	estimate	resilience	and	the	approach	is	Monte‐Carlo	based.	It	means	that	
in	order	for	the	results	to	be	reliable	the	number	of	simulations	is	typically	required	to	be	
very	high.	
	
1.5 Tips for Generating Metrics  
	
1.5.1 Generalized Metric Development Process 
	
The	following	process	towards	the	development	of	metrics	is	adapted	by	McKay	et	al.	2012.		
1. Objective	Setting:	Articulate	clear,	specific	goals.	This	should	be	done	in	a	structured	
manner.	Gregory	and	Keeney	(2002)	outline	a	structured	approach	to	do	this.	
a. Write	down	all	of	the	concerns	that	the	project	team	feels	is	relevant.	
b. Convert	those	concerns	into	succinct	verb‐object	goals	(e.g.,	minimize	downtime).		
c. Next,	these	should	be	organized,	often	hierarchically,	separating	goals	which	
represent	means	from	those	which	represent	ends.		
d. Finally,	review	and	clarification	should	be	conducted	with	the	project	team.	This	
may	be	an	iterative	process.		
2. Develop	Metrics:	Once	the	objectives	are	clearly	articulated	and	organized,	metrics	can	be	
formally	developed.	
a. The	first	step	is	to	select	a	broad	set	of	metrics,	which	may	be	selected	from	existing	
lists	or	guidelines,	or	created	by	a	project	team	or	subject	matter	experts	for	the	
particular	purpose	at	hand.	This	step	is	where	the	Resilience	Matrix	could	facilitate	
metric	development.	
b. Next,	this	set	of	metrics	should	be	evaluated	and	screened	to	determine	whether	it	
meets	the	project	objectives	and	the	degree	to	which	the	metrics	meet	the	desirable	
qualities	of	metrics,	explained	earlier	in	this	chapter.	At	this	stage,	remaining	
metrics	can	be	prioritized.		
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c. Finally	the	remaining	metrics	should	be	documented,	including	assumptions	and	
limitations,	and	other	supporting	information.	
3. Combination	and	Comparison:	A	method	should	be	developed	for	how	the	metrics	will	
ultimately	be	used	to	support	decision	making	and	drive	action.	Some	methods	include:	
a. Narrative	Description:	Simple	techniques	where	trade‐offs	may	be	simple	such	as	
listing	evidence	or	best	professional	judgement.	
b. Arithmetic	Combination:	Simple	mathematical	techniques	for	combining	dissimilar	
metrics	such	as	simple	aggregation	of	metrics	with	similar	units	(e.g.,	cost),	
converting	to	similar	units	(e.g.,	monetization),	or	normalizing	to	a	similar	scale	
(e.g.,	0	to	1).	
c. Multi‐Criteria	Decision	Analysis:	A	method	for	weighting	and	scoring	dissimilar	
decision	criteria	based	on	their	relative	importance	and	performance	with	respect	
to	an	objective.	
d. Interdependent	Combination:	For	systems	that	are	complex,	usually	involving	
intricate	internal	relationships,	more	intensive	modeling	efforts	may	be	necessary,	
such	as	Bayesian	networks	or	other	complex	systems	modeling	techniques.	
The	above‐mentioned	process,	along	with	a	solid	metric	development	process,	can	greatly	
aid	in	devising	effective	metrics.	Often	it	is	necessary	to	develop	a	conceptual	model	of	the	
system	in	order	to	identify	the	functional	relationships	and	critical	elements	and	processes	
within	a	system.	This	can	be	done	using	a	Network	Science	approach	described	above.	
	
1.5.2 Best Practices in Metric Development and Validation 
	
Validation	of	metrics	is	an	often	overlooked	aspect	of	the	metric	development	process.	
Neely	et	al.	(1997)	provide	some	questions	to	ask	regarding	whether	the	output	from	the	
metrics	is	appropriate,	specifically	whether	the	metrics	have	a	specific	purpose,	are	based	
on	an	explicit	formula	and/or	data	source,	and	are	objective	and	not	based	solely	on	
opinion	(Neely	et	al.,	1997).	Similarly,	Eckerson	(2009)	lays	out	a	series	of	questions	that	
can	serve	as	a	quality	check	on	developed	metrics,	to	ensure	that	they	are	of	high	quality:	
•	Does	it	link	to	strategy?	
•	Can	it	be	quantified?	
•	Does	it	drive	the	right	behavior?	
•	Is	it	understandable?	
•	Is	it	actionable?	
•	Does	the	data	exist?	
	
Regarding	the	number	of	metrics	necessary,	it	isn’t	necessarily	the	quantity	of	metrics	that	
constitute	a	successful	implementation,	but	whether	these	metrics	are	collectively	
comprehensive	enough	to	address	everything	deemed	important	(McKay	et	al.	2012).		
Eckerson	(2009)	recommends	that	a	set	of	metrics	be	sparse,	since	with	a	limited	number	
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of	metrics	it	is	easier	to	analyze	how	metric‐level	changes	drive	the	performance	in	the	
system,	as	well	as	the	practical	fact	that	gathering,	synthesizing,	and	presenting	multiple	
data	streams	often	takes	quite	some	time.	More	granular,	process‐level	metrics	may	still	be	
required	however,	and	Eckerson	(2009)	proposes	a	MAD	(monitor,	analyze,	drill)	
framework	for	presenting	different	levels	of	resolution	to	different	users	of	that	
information.	
	
Another	ongoing	element	of	validation	is	traceability,	as	evidenced	in	the	framework	
presented	by	Neely	et	al.	(1997),	which	includes	a	list	of	information	(known	as	the	
performance	measure	record	sheet)	such	as	how	often	data	is	to	be	collected,	and	by	
whom,	as	well	as	important	questions	such	as	“who	acts	on	the	data?”	and	“what	do	they	
do?”.	If	these	questions	are	considered	and	answered	as	the	need	arises,	it	is	known	who	is	
responsible	for	making	the	measurement	and	what	actions	are	to	be	taken	as	a	result.	This	
can	reveal	insight	into	the	metric	and	how	they	are	measured	and	being	utilized,	not	just	
for	the	current	project	but	for	future	reference.	An	item	on	the	list	asks	what	the	metric	
“relates	to.”	This	can	assist	in	entering	the	mindset	of	approaching	metrics	with	an	
interconnected	and	goal‐oriented	viewpoint.		
	
Other	validation‐related	efforts	include	standardizing	methods	for	ICS	metric	development	
and	implementation,	as	well	as	institutionalizing	a	clear	means	to	integrate	metrics	with	
decision	analytic	tools	to	support	the	risk	management	process.	Finally,	given	the	dynamic	
nature	of	cyber	threats,	periodic	review	and	updating	of	ICS	metrics	should	be	conducted	to	
keep	abreast	of	the	latest	developments	in	the	field.	
1.6 Conclusions 
Despite	existing	guidelines	and	frameworks,	designing	and	managing	for	security	in	cyber‐enabled	
systems	remains	difficult.	This	is	in	large	part	due	to	the	challenges	associated	with	the	
measurement	of	security.		A	critical	element	in	eliciting	a	meaningful	metric	is	in	gathering	the	
relevant	information	about	one’s	system	and	aligning	that	metric	with	measurable	goals	and	
strategic	objectives.		For	ICSs,	time,	safety	and	continuation	of	services	factor	considerably	into	
overall	goals,	since	many	systems	are	in	a	position	where	a	failure	can	result	in	a	threat	to	human	
lives,	environmental	safety,	or	production	output.		Often	it	is	necessary	to	develop	a	conceptual	
model	of	the	system	or	develop	a	standardized	list	of	questions	or	topics	helps	to	identify	critical	
process	elements,	the	functional	relationships	and	critical	elements	and	processes	within	a	system.		
In	this	chapter,	we	discuss	in	detail	two	approaches	for	the	generation	of	broadly	applicable	
security	and	resilience	metrics	and	their	integration	to	quantify	system	resilience.	The	first	method	
is	a	semi‐quantitative	approach	in	which	the	stages	of	the	event	management	cycle	(plan/prepare,	
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absorb,	recover,	and	adapt)	are	applied	across	four	relevant	domains	(physical,	information,	
cognitive,	social),	forming	a	matrix	of	potential	security	metrics.	Second	is	a	quantitative	approach	
based	on	Network	Science,	in	which	features	such	as	network	topologies	can	be	modeled	to	assess	
the	magnitude	and	responsiveness	of	the	critical	functionalities	of	networked	systems.	Validation	of	
metrics	is	an	often	overlooked	aspect	of	the	metric	development	process;	however	a	series	of	
questions	can	serve	as	a	quality	check	on	developed	metrics,	to	ensure	that	they	are	of	high	quality.	
	
Permission	was	granted	by	the	USACE	Chief	of	Engineers	to	publish	this	material.	The	views	and	
opinions	expressed	in	this	paper	are	those	of	the	individual	authors	and	not	those	of	the	US	Army,	
or	other	sponsor	organizations.	
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